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CORPORATIONS

Piercing the Corporate Veil

During the survey period, many of the cases decided by the Georgia
Supreme Court, the Georgia Court of Appeals, and the United States district courts in Georgia relating to corporations concerned the familiar corporate law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. In most of these cases,
the courts relied on and applied the standards developed by the supreme
court's 1991 decision in Hickman v. Hyzer,l a decision reviewed in last
year's survey article.2 In Hickman the court set forth a test to be applied
in cases that concern piercing by reason of allegations of corporate undercapitalization.$ The court held "that for undercapitalization of a corporation to justify piercing the corporate veil, it must be coupled with evidence of an intent at the time of'4 the capitalization to improperly avoid
future debts of the corporation.

In Marett v. Professional Insurance Careers, Inc.," the Georgia Court
of Appeals reversed the lower court, which had denied defendant's motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
finding sufficient evidence to warrant piercing the corporate veil.6 The
court of appeals held that there was no issue of fact for the jury to decide
with respect to piercing, and therefore, the question of defendant's piercing liability never should have been submitted to the jury.' The court
applied the test from Hickman by stating that "undercapitalization of a
corporation will justify piercing the corporate veil only when 'coupled
with evidence of an intent at the time of the capitalization to improperly
avoid future debts of the corporation.' " In applying this test, the court
determined that appellee presented no evidence of fraud at trial, nor evidence of disregard for the corporate form, otherwise known as the "alter
ego" test, through commingling of corporate and personal assets.' The
court concluded that, "[l]ike the corporation in Hickman, [appellant's]
company was shown to be nothing more than an unsuccessful business
1. 261 Ga. 38, 401 S.E.2d 738 (1991).
2. See Paul A. Quir6s & Lynn Scott Magruder, Business Associations, 43 MERCER L.
Rev.85, 86 (1991).
3. 261 Ga. at 39-40, 401 S.E.2d at 740.
4. Id.
5. 201 Ga. App. 178, 410 S.E.2d 373 (1991).
6. Id. at 182, 410 S.E.2d at 376.
7. Id. at 181, 410 S.E.2d at 376.
8. Id., 410 S.E.2d at 375 (quoting 261 Ga. at 40, 401 S.E.2d at 740).
9. Id. at 180-81, 410 S.E.2d at 375.
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venture" and that appellant was entitled to a directed verdict on the
piercing issue. 10
In 1987, appellant Marett, along with his two codefendants, formed a
holding company, NTFI Holdings, Inc. ("NTFI"), ostensibly for the purpose of acquiring National Trust Fire Insurance Company ("NTFIC")
through the purchase of its stock. Appellee, Professional Insurance Careers, Inc. ("PIC"), solicited NTFI and Marett's business and offered its
services in locating a chief executive officer for NTFIC. Lee Richards,
PIC's president, testified at trial that he had referred a candidate to
Marett in 1987 who NTFIC employed in the following year, a point disputed by Marett at trial. Also, Richards testified that invoices sent to
Marett for a fee of forty-five thousand dollars for procuring" the executive
candidate went unpaid. At trial, the parties disputed exactly who was
PIC's client. Marett testified that NTFI acquired NTFIC by using financing that left the insurance company with a negative net worth; however,
he stated that his plan required additional investors to contribute five
million dollars in capital for the company to begin writing insurance policies. Because of an inability to obtain such additional capital NTFI eventually sold the insurance company. Also, Marett testified that he was a
principal in twenty-seven corporations and partnerships that operated
from the same office and that he frequently wrote employee paychecks
from one company's account which the other entities reimbursed."
The court of appeals agreed with Marett, holding that the trial court
had erred by submitting to the jury the issue of whether the evidence
authorized piercing the corporate veil of NTFIC. 1' The court used the
often quoted language of Trans-American Communications v.Nolle1 3 in
discussing the alter ego test. 4 The court explained that in order to pierce
the corporate veil and disregard the corporate entity, the evidence must
show that a shareholder's
"disregard of the corporate entity made it a mere instrumentality for the
transaction of [its) own affairs; that there [was] such unity of interest
and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the
owners no longer exist; and [that] to adhere to the doctrine of corporate
entity would promote injustice or protect fraud."" 5
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 181, 410 S.E.2d at 376.
Id. at 178-80, 410 S.E.2d at 374-75.
Id. at 182, 410 S.E.2d at 376.
134 Ga. App. 457, 214 S.E.2d 717 (1975).
201 Ga. App. at 180-81, 410 S.E.2d at 375.
Id. (quoting 134 Ga. App. at 460, 214 S.E.2d at 717).
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The court found no evidence of commingling of personal and corporate
assets or disregard for the corporate form.16 However, the court noted
that there appeared to be some evidence of commingling of assets of various corporations owned by Marett. 17 The court pointed out that Marett
had admitted that NTFI had not been capitalized sufficiently to begin
operating as an insurance company.18 The court quoted Hickman, noting
its requirement of" 'intent at the time of the capitalization to improperly
avoid future [corporate] debts'" to justify piercing." Without evidence of
fraudulent intent on the part of Marett, at the time of the capitalization
of NTFIC, the court concluded that NTFIC
[1]ike the corporation in Hickman, .

.

. was shown to be nothing more

than an unsuccessful business venture, "not a case of wrongdoing, fraud
and bad faith on the part of a corporate [officer and that t]he ... record
[did] not create an issue of fact for the jury regarding piercing the corporate veil" 20

In Hartkopf v. Heinrich Ad. Berkemann,21 the court of appeals applied
the Hickman test relating to possible undercapitalization and the alter
ego. test to determine if it should pierce the corporate veil.22 In Hartkopf
the court affirmed the lower court's denial of Heinrich Ad. Berkemann's
("HAB") motion for summary judgment to pierce the corporate veil of
Hermes Enterprises, Inc. ("HEI") and find its shareholders liable for
HEI's debts to HAB.2 As in Marett, the court applied the Hickman test
and held that even if a corporation is found to be undercapitalized, when
there is no evidence of fraudulent intent at the time of its capitalization
and insufficient evidence of fraud or misuse of corporate assets, piercing
2
the corporate veil will not be authorized. '

In Lawton v. Temple- Warren Ford, Inc.,2 5 the court of appeals applied
the Hickman test again.2 ' However, the court noted that corporate undercapitalization analyzed in Hickman is only one rationale for piercing the
16. Id. at 181, 410 S.E.2d at 375.
17. Id., 410 S.E.2d at 376. See also Lawson v. Athens Auto Supply & Elec., 200 Ga. App.
609, 409 S.E.2d 90 (1991) (in which sole shareholder of corporations commingled and confused corporations' funds and made several personal loans from the corporations to himself
that, as inferred from the evidence, went unrepaid, authorized piercing of the corporate
veil).
18. 201 Ga. App. at 181, 410 S.E.2d at 375.
19. Id., (quoting 261 Ga. at 40, 401 S.E.2d at 740).
20. Id., 410 S.E.2d at 376 (quoting 261 Ga. at 41, 401 S.E.2d at 740).
21. 200 Ga. App. 355, 408 S.E.2d 450 (1991).
22. Id. at 357, 408 S.E.2d at 453.
23. Id. at 358, 408 S.E.2d at 453-54.
24. Id. at 357, 408 S.E.2d at 453.
25. 203 Ga. App. 222, 416 S.E.2d 527 (1992).
26. Id. at 222, 416 S.E.2d at 528.
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corporate veil.2 ' Citing Marett, the court stated that the alter ego test
discussed in Marett provided another rationale for piercing2 8 Also, the
court cited Commonwealth Financial Corp. v. Sherrill,29 noting that the
separateness of the corporate entity also will be disregarded if a party has
overextended its privilege in the use of a corporate form to perpetrate
fraud or avoid tort responsibility3n However, the court held that there
was no evidence in the present case to warrant piercing defendant's corporate veil under any of these rationales, thus affirming the trial court's
motion for summary judgment in favor of defendant on this issue."
Appellant Lawton purchased a truck from appellee Temple-Warren
Ford, Inc. ("Temple-Warren"). Lawton claimed that Temple-Warren
sales personnel represented the truck to him as a 1984 model truck. The
truck was in fact a 1984 "glider kit," a truck whose engine, transmission,
and rear wheels were taken from an older model. Lawton sued TempleWarren alleging fraud in the sale of the truck, and later amended his
complaint to add as defendants the company's two shareholders. The defendant shareholders' affidavits and depositions contained statements
averring that neither of them had participated in the sale of the truck to
Lawton, nor were they aware that Lawton had not been fully informed
about the rebuilding of the truck. The court of appeals found these statements to be uncontroverted. Additionally, in his deposition one of the
shareholders stated that despite a one million dollar initial capitalization
of the corporation, he felt the corporation had been undercapitalized
from its inception because the company's growth exceeded his expectaacted as an admission of untions. Lawton asserted that this statement
2
dercapitalization of the corporation .
The court of appeals, applying the Hickman test to the facts of this
case, held that even if a shareholder admitted the undercapitalization of
the corporation, such admission did not justify piercing the corporate
veil.33 The court stated that any proof of undercapitalization "'must be
coupled with evidence of an intent at the time of the capitalization to
improperly avoid future debts of the corporation.' "834 The court found no
evidence at the time of Temple-Warren's capitalization of this type of
intent nor evidence of any attempts to avoid future debts of the corpora27.
28.
S.E.2d
29.
30.
439).
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 223, 416 S.E.2d at 528.
Id. (citing Marett v. Professional Ins. Careers, Inc., 201 Ga. App. 178, 180-81, 410
373, 375).
197 Ga. App. 403, 398 S.E.2d 438 (1990).
203 Ga. App. at 223, 416 S.E.2d at 528 (citing 197 Ga. App. at 404, 398 S.E.2d at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 224, 416 S.E.2d at 529.
at 222-23, 416 S.E.2d at 527-29.
at 222, 416 S.E.2d at 528.
(quoting Hickman, 261 Ga. at 39-40, 401 S.E.2d at 740).
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tion.35 The court stated that the Hickman test provided only one rationale for piercing the corporate veil, and addressed Lawton's assertion that
fraud by the shareholders justified a disregard of the corporate entity.'
The court stated that "the separateness of the corporate entity will be
disregarded to remedy injustices which arise where a party has overextended his privilege in the use of a corporate entity in order to perpetrate
fraud or to avoid tort responsibility.187 After analyzing the record of the
case and finding no evidence of the shareholders' involvement in the sale
of the truck to Lawton or that they had any knowledge of the information
conveyed to Lawton during the sale negotiations, the court found the evidence insufficient to support a finding that the shareholders hid behind
the corporate entity to insulate themselves from fraud. 8 The court did
not find evidence of an attempt to improperly avoid future debts of the
corporation, even though one of the shareholders had removed "two hundred fifty thousand dollars of the dealership's capital to cover problems
in another business he was operating."' 9 Thus, the court affirmed the trial
court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment, disallowing
piercing of the corporate veil.'0
1
In Summit-Top Development, Inc. v. Williamson Construction,Inc.,'
the court of appeals applied the more traditional rationales for piercing
the corporate veil and affirmed the lower court's verdict against the prin-2
cipal shareholders of Summit-Top Development, Inc. ("Summit-Top").'

The court applied the alter ego and evasion of liability rationales to the
facts of this case.' 8 The court found that defendants had historically used
the corporate form to evade business obligations and affirmed the trial
court's decision holding the defendant shareholders personally liable for
Summit-Top's obligation to the plaintiff."
In March 1988, Summit-Top retained Williamson Construction, Inc.
("Williamson") to perform certain pipe installation and other work on a
subdivision being developed by Summit-Top. Williamson billed SummitTop on a monthly basis for work performed. Summit-Top paid the invoices on this basis until a dispute arose over an invoice in September
1988. Summit-Top'and Williamson failed to resolve the dispute and Williamson eventually ceased work on the subdivision project and brought an
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 223, 416 S.E.2d at 528.
Id.
Id. at 224, 416 S.E.2d at 529.
Id. at 222, 416 S.E.2d at 528.
Id. at 224, 416 S.E.2d at 529.
203 Ga. App. 460, 416 S.E.2d 889 (1992).
Id. at 464, 416 S.E.2d at 892.
Id. at 463-64, 41Q S.E.2d at 892.
Id. at 464, 416 S.E.2d at 892.

19921

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

action against Summit-Top and its principal shareholders to recover the
outstanding balance. The trial court returned a verdict in favor of Williamson against Summit-Top and its principal shareholders, finding that
the shareholders had abused the corporate form, and were therefore, personally liable for the corporation's debt to Williamson. On appeal, the
shareholders argued that the evidence failed to establish that they had
abused the corporate form. Williamson contended that the shareholders,
in addition to the present case, had used corporations to avoid legitimate
claims of subcontractors on previous projects." The court of appeals
agreed with Williamson.'
The court reviewed the various veil-piercing principles and stated that
the corporate form will be disregarded as a mere alter ego of a person if it
is shown that it has "'been used as a subterfuge so that to observe it
would work an injustice.' ",i7 The court determined that the corporation
must be shown to be "'a mere instrumentality for the transaction of [the
shareholders'] own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no
longer exist.' ",48 Applying these rationales to the present case, the court
found that the principal shareholders had been involved in several similar
projects that had "left in their wake numerous unpaid contractors and
subcontractors whose recourse appears to be enforcement of materialmen's liens against insolvent corporations."' 4 Also, the court found that
the principal shareholders' own testimony evinced "a pattern of practice
wherein the corporate entity is a mere instrumentality to evade contractual responsibility and that [Williamson] is now a victim of that course of
conduct." 0 The court concluded that the evidence supported the verdict
against the principal shareholders personally. 1
During the survey period, the Georgia courts focused too frequently on
the undercapitalization test set forth in Hickman. This test is difficult to
apply in the business context of minimum capitalization and interferes
with traditional analysis of piercing issues. Summit Top allowed a pattern of practice in past corporations to find the shareholders liable for
their actions in a new corporate entity. This decision, which includes minimal factual information, extends veil piercing rationale in a troubling
manner.
45. Id. at 460-64, 416 S.E.2d at 890-92.
46. Id. at 463-64, 416 S.E.2d at 892.
47. Id. at 463, 416 S.E.2d at 892 (quoting Amason v. Whitehead, 186 Ga. App. 320, 32122, 367 S.E.2d 107, 108 (1988)).
48. Id. (quoting Amason, 186 Ga. App. at 321-22, 416 S.E.2d at 108).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 464, 416 S.E.2d at 892.
51. Id.
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B. Tortious Interference
In Rome Industries,Inc. v. Jonsson,52 the court of appeals addressed a
case of first impression." Defendant in a breach of contract suit filed a
counterclaim against plaintiff, alleging tortious interference with the fiduciary relationship between plaintiff corporation and its president.5 4 The
court held that the relationship between a corporation and its president is
essentially a contractual one, and therefore, any action on the part of a
third party to induce an executive to breach that contractual duty is actionable as tortious interference with contractual relations."5
Tow Tractors, Inc. ("TTI") filed a breach of contract action against
Rome Industries, -Inc. ("Rome") that arose out of a series of business
transactions between TTI and Rome. Rome counterclaimed against TTI,
adding appellee Jonsson and others as defendants in the counterclaim.
Rome alleged that defendants interfered with the fiduciary relationship
between Rome's president and Rome by inducing the president to breach
his fiduciary duty to the corporation. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the counterclaim defendants on the ground that the
allegations did not state a claim under Georgia law.",
On appeal, the court stated that although no precedent concerning a
claim for tortious interference with a fiduciary relationship between a corporation and one of its officers existed, the court would analogize this case
to cases concerning claims of tortious interference with employment relationships, long recognized as actionable under Georgia law. 7 The court
stated that the fiduciary relationship that exists between a corporation
and its officers is one that arises out of a contractual or employment relationship between the parties, and "Georgia has long recognized the tort of
wrongful interference with employment relationships."" The court noted
that such actions usually arise from an alleged inducement of an employee to break his employment contract with his employer, and it saw no
reason why liability should be limited to only those cases concerning a
total breach of an employment contract. 59 The court pointed out that:
"[olne under a duty to render a performance has a property interest in
the contract in that he has the right to render the required performance
free from unjustified and unprivileged intentional invasions that retard
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

202 Ga. App. 682, 415 S.E.2d 651 (1992).
Id. at 683, 415 S.E.2d at 652.
Id. at 682-83, 415 S.E.2d at 651-52.
Id. at 683, 415 S.E.2d at 652.
Id. at 682-83, 415 S.E.2d at 651-52.
Id. at 683, 415 S.E.2d at 652.
Id.
Id.
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performance or make the performance more difficult or expensive. Interference of that type constitutes an actionable tort which embraces within
its scope all intentional invasions of contractual relations, including any
act . . . interfering with the performance itself, regardless of whether
breach of contract is induced.""
Thus, tortious interference with employment relations includes not only
inducement to breach a contract but also inducement to breach a duty
owed to an employer under the contract. The court reversed the trial
court's granting of summary judgment to appellees and held that a claim
of tortious interference with fiduciary relationship between a corporation
and its executive does state a claim under Georgia law. 1 Georgia practitioners should hope that this type of tortious interference claim is not
regularly pleaded.
In SunAmerica Financial, Inc. v. 260 Peachtree Street, Inc.,62 the
court of appeals again confronted a case of first impression in the area of
tortious interference with contractual relations.63 In SunAmerica the
court addressed the question of whether the parent of a wholly-owned
subsidiary can be deemed a third party, as a matter of law, capable of
tortiously interfering with the contractual relations between such subsidiary and another party.' The court concluded that circumstances could
arise under which the parent could be deemed to have interests so different from the subsidiary that it could be deemed to be a third party capable of tortiously interfering with that subsidiary's contract with another."
Appellee, 260 Peachtree Street, Inc. ("Peachtree"), was successor in interest as lessor under a lease to which appellant, SunAmerica Financial,
Inc. ("SAF"), had succeeded as lessee by assignment. SAF was a whollyowned subsidiary of SunAmerica Corporation ("SAC"), which in turn was
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Broad, Inc. ("Broad"). Contemporaneous
with SAF's succession to the lessee's interest under the lease, SAC executed an unconditional guarantee of payment and lease obligation performance. Soon thereafter, SAF moved its operations and vacated the
leased premises. SAF continued to pay rent under the lease while attempting to sublease the premises. The attempted subletting proved unsuccessful due to the presence of asbestos within the premises. Subsequently, a dispute arose due to a planned renovation of the premises by
SAF and a request that Peachtree remove all of the asbestos on the prem60.
84, 89,
61.
62.
63.

Id' at 684, 415 S.E.2d at 652 (quoting Perry & Co. v. New South Ins., 182 Ga. App.
354 S.E.2d 852, 857 (1987)).
Id.
202 Ga. App. 790, 415 S.E.2d 677 (1992).
Id. at 797, 415 S.E.2d at 684.
64. Id. at 797-98, 415 S.E.2d at 684.
65. Id. at 798, 415 S.E.2d at 684.
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ises. Ultimately Peachtree received notification from a senior vice president of Broad, who was also a director of SAF, that they would withhold
further rental payments because of Peachtree's failure to fulfill its lease
obligations. Peachtree brought an action seeking payment of rents due
under the lease from SAF and from the guarantor of the lease, SAC, as
well as a claim against Broad for tortious interference with the lease contract between SAF and Peachtree. Broad moved to dismiss on the
grounds of failure to state a claim, asserting that a parent corporation
cannot tortiously interfere with contractual obligations between one of its
subsidiaries and another party. The trial court granted Broad's motion to
dismiss and Peachtree appealed the issue as cross 7appellant to SAF's appeal on other grounds. 6
The court of appeals declined to accept the trial court's conclusion that
"'[a] parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary have "a complete unity of
interest,"" and, therefore cannot tortiously interfere with the whollyowned subsidiary's contractual relations. 7 Rather, the court noted that
while "'a third person must have maliciously and without lawful justification induced [a] breach of an existing contract or caused the termination
of a recognized contractual relation'" for there to be tortious interference
with a contract, the court could not conclude that the parent of a whollyowned subsidiary "cannot be deemed, as a matter of law, a third party
capable of tortiously interfering with the contracts of said subsidiaries."' 18
The court found precedent for the proposition that a parent corporation,
acting through its officers, directors, or agents, normally does not stand in
the position of third-party stranger to a contract between one of its subsidiaries and another party in order for there to be tortious interference
with that contractual relationship.6 9 However, the court noted that there
can arise circumstances under which the interests of the corporation and
its wholly-owned subsidiary may differ.7 0 Therefore, the court was reluctant to establish a bright line test that would eliminate parent corporations as possible tortfeasors in dealing with their wholly-owned subsidiaries' contractual relations with others.71 The court held that
the better rule appears to be that of giving a qualified privilege to the
parent corporation, permitting it to interfere with a wholly-owned subsidiary's, or the latter's wholly-owned subsidiary's, contractual relations
with another party when the contract threatens a present economic in66.
67.
Corp.,
68.
69.

Id. at 790-92, 415 S.E.2d at 678-80.
Id. at 797, 415 S.E.2d at 683-84 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tilbe
467 U.S. 752 (1984)).
Id. at 797-98, 415 S.E.2d at 684.
Id. at 798, 415 S.E.2d at 684.

70. Id.
71. Id.
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terest of said subsidiary, absent clear evidence that the parent employed
wrongful means or acted with improper purpose.7"
In examining the record, the court found genuine issues of material fact
existed concerning whether Broad or its officers had acted as officers of
Broad or simply. agents of SAF, whether Broad employed wrongful
means, and whether Broad had an improper purpose in its termination of
the lease.7 3 Reversing the trial court's judgment, the appeals court stated
that, generally, issues regarding wrongful means used or improper purposes acted upon normally present questions of fact for a jury to decide;
however, when evidence shows clearly that a jury could reasonably draw
74
only one conclusion, the case may be decided as a matter of law.
This novel case illustrates that attorneys representing corporations and
their wholly-owned subsidiaries should advise their clients to act scrupulously and correspond at the proper level and not allow the parent to act
for a wholly-owned subsidiary that may have interests diverse from those
of the parent.
In a case that pre-dated SunAmerica, the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia applied a bright line test for tortious
interference by a parent corporation. In Anderson Chemical Co. v. Portals Water Treatment, Inc.,75 the court concluded that no action for tortious interference with contract against the parent of a wholly-owned subsidiary can be maintained in cases when the parent is charged with
interfering with its subsidiary's agreement with another party.76
In November 1987, Portals Water Treatment, Inc. ("Portals") and Anderson Chemical Company, Inc. ("Anderson") entered into an alleged
nonbinding letter of intent. Plaintiff, Anderson, argued the binding nature of the contract, whereby Portals was to purchase Anderson. The parties did not agree upon or execute a purchase agreement and Portals' parent company, Portals Holdings, PLC of the United Kingdom ("PHPLC"),
did not exercise its right to approve the transaction. In early 1988, Portals
informed Anderson that it had decided not to consummate the purchase.
Anderson, its subsidiaries and stockholders filed suit against PHPLC and
its United States subsidiaries, Wright Chemical Company and Portals, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and tortious interference with contractual and current and prospective business relations by PHPLC. 77
The court determined that the November writing did not constitute an
enforceable contract, and thus, Anderson's claim for tortious interference
72.
73.
74,
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
768 F. Supp. 1568 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
Id. at 1584.
Id. at 1577.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

with contractual rights had no merit. 8 With respect to the claim of tortious interference with business relations, the court held that PHPLC
could not have tortiously interfered with a contract that was subject to
PHPLC's approval.79 Additionally, the court stated that "tortious interference claims require the action of a third party, and this requirement
cannot be satisfied by the action of [a] wholly-owned subsidiary and its
parent. ' ' 80 Subsequently, the court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims.' 1 This case stated the law concerning tortious interference by a parent corporation with its subsidiary before the
SunAmerica case.
C. Fiduciary Duty of Directors
In Gardiner v. McDaniel,8 the court of appeals clarified that the fiduciary duty owed to a corporation and its shareholders by a director does
not apply to personal transactions between a director and the corporation's president. 83 The court held that when a corporate director and the
corporation's president enter into an agreement that concerns the
purchase and sale of the corporation's shares, absent a special relationship of trust or confidence between the two, the president may not assert
the director's fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders as a
defense to a breach of the agreement."
Plaintiff acted as a director and owned shares in a closely held corporation. Defendant served as the president and owned shares of the corporation. Defendant executed a promissory note to plaintiff in return for all of
plaintiff's shares. After defendant defaulted on the note, plaintiff filed
suit to collect the unpaid accelerated amount due under the note. Defendant raised the defense of fraudulent misrepresentation, claiming that
plaintiff misrepresented the note to defendant as a corporate obligation
rather than a personal one in violation of plaintiff's fiduciary duty to defendant as a director." Defendant claimed that plaintiff's position as a
director and defendant's position as a shareholder relieved defendant of
his "obligation to exercise ordinary diligence to verify the terms of the
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. a. 1579.
Id. at 1584.
Id.
Id.
202 Ga. App. 663, 4t15 S.E.2d 303 (1992).
Id. at 664, 415 S.E.2d at 304.
Id.
Id. at 663, 415 S.E.2d at 303.
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note that he signed." 8 The court granted plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and defendant appealed.87
In affirming the trial court's grant of plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, the court of appeals held that plaintiff owed its fiduciary duty
as a director to the shareholders. 8 The court also explained that in this
transaction plaintiff acted simply as a seller of his shares in the corporation, not as a director." The court further explained that sellers and purchasers of property are presumed to be dealing at arm's length, and noted
that the alleged fraud did not relate to the value of the shares, but
whether the note was a personal obligation. The court explained that
under these circumstances, absent a special relationship of trust or confidence, defendant could not be relieved of his duty to exercise ordinary
diligence on his own behalf.1"
D. Successor Liability
In Cilurso v. Premier Crown Corp.,"2 the. United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia examined a tort claim against a corporate defendant that had acquired all of the assets of another corporation
whose product had given rise to the tort claim.9 3 The court refused to
extend Georgia law on successor liability beyond the parameters established by the Georgia Supreme Court.4 The court held that enjoyment of
the good will and identity of the product manufactured by the company
whose assets the defendant corporation purchased did not give rise to
successor liability under Georgia law.95
In 1978, Sirchie Finger Print Laboratories, Inc. ("Sirchie") purchased
the assets of defendant Premier Safety Equipment Company ("PSE")
under an agreement expressly excluding any assumption of PSE's liabilities. PSE manufactured, among other things, police motorcycle helmets
under the Premier brand label. Later that year, defendant Premier Crown
Corporation ("PCC"), a newly formed corporation, acquired all of
Sirchie's interest in PSE. Neither Sirchie nor PCC ever manufactured a
safety helmet under the Premier brand label. In 1983, officer Anthony
Cilurso of the Warner Robins Police Department was killed while on duty
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 663-64, 415 S.E.2d at 304.
Id. at 663, 415 S.E.2d at 303.
Id. at 664, 415 S.E.2d at 304.
Id.
Id.
Id.
769 F. Supp. 372 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
Id. at 373.
Id. at 374.
Id.
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when his Premier brand helmet came off during a motorcycle accident.
Cilurso's estate brought an action against Sirchie and PCC alleging liability as successors to PSE. Defendants Sirchie and PCC moved for summary judgment.6
The court explained that in Georgia a corporation purchasing another
corporation does not assume that corporation's liabilities, "unless: (1)
there is an agreement to assume liabilities; (2) the transaction is, in fact, a
merger; (3) the transaction is a fraudulent attempt to avoid liabilities; or,
(4) the purchaser is a mere continuation of the predecessor corporation."' "9The court found that plaintiff's allegations did not suggest fraud
or a merger of the entities and that Sirchie's purchase agreement expressly excluded any assumption of PSE's liabilities.0 8 The court stated
that in a continuation argument Georgia law requires "some identity of
ownership between the asset purchaser and the seller." 9 ' The court found
no evidence to support such an' allegation and, to the contrary, pointed
out that plaintiffs had "named and served the principal officer of the defunct PSE as a party defendant."100 In granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment, the court stated that plaintiffs' central arguments
that successor liability should be applied, because PCC enjoyed PSE's
good will and identity of the manufactured product, were "confusions of]
arguments advocating the expansion of Georgia law for a successor liability theory."' 01
E. Legislative Changes
The General Assembly enacted only two significant pieces of legislation
affecting corporations in 1992. House Bill 1649, which became effective on
July 1, 1992, is codified as the new Chapter 11 of Title 14 of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").10 2 The new legislation creates
requirements and rights for a new statutory entity, the "foreign limited
liability company" ("LLC").' 03 Like shareholders of corporations and limited partners of limited partnerships, LLC members enjoy limited liability. The LLC avoids the need for a general partner while maintaining the
tax advantages of a "pass through" entity. Furthermore, the LLC is not
96.
97.
(1985)).
98.
99.

Id. at 373.
Id. (citing Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 254 Ga. 283, 284, 328 S.E.2d 726, 727
Id. at 373.74.
Id. at 374.

100. Id.
101.
102.

Id.
O.C.G.A. §§ 14-11-1 to -19 (Supp. 1992).

103. ld. § 14-11-1.
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constrained by the shareholder and capital structure limitations imposed
on Subchapter S corporations.
There are two significant features to the new statute. First, LLCs transacting business in Georgia must obtain a certificate of authority from the
Secretary of State's office and appoint a registered agent for service of
process."" Second, the laws of the foreign jurisdiction under which the
LLC organized must "govern its organization[J, . . . internal affairs[,]
. . .liability of its managers, members, and other owners, regardless of

whether [or not the LLC] procured or should have procured a certificate
[from the Secretary of State under the new Chapter 11J.1" Foreign lim-=
ited liability companies are defined Under the new law as "a limited liability company formed under the laws of a jurisdiction other. than this
state."10 The law also provides some exceptions to what constitutes
.
transacting business in the state.10
change of registered agent
resignation,
appointment,
provisions
for
The
requirements for annual
agent,
a
registered
or office, failure to appoint
reporting to the Secretary of State, and consequences for failing to obtain
a certificate of authority parallel the corresponding provisions in the corporate code and limited partnership code.10 8
House Bill 1612 amends O.C.G.A. section 14-2-15111 by extending to
documents executed by a corporation's president or vice-president and
attested by a secretary or assistant secretary without a corporate seal the
same right of third parties to rely on the validity and due authorization of
the instrument, as was afforded to the same documents that included a
corporate seal.110 The same bill also deleted from O.C.G.A. section 14-57(a)"' the requirement of a corporate seal on documents conveying title
to real property for entitlement to a presumption of authority."2
II. BANKS
In Milligan v. Gilmore Meyer, Inc.,113 the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia analyzed the application of the doctrine developed by the Supreme Court in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
104. Id. §2 14-11-3, -4.
105: Id. § 14-11-2(a).

106. Id. § 14-11-1.
107. Id. § 14-11-3(b).
108. Id. §2 14-11-4, -12, -14.
109. Id. § 14-2-151 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. § 14-2-151(a).
Id. § 14-5-7.
Id. § 14-5-7(a).
775 F. Supp. 400 (S.D. Ga. 1991).
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FDIC""to a rather complex real estate transaction and later foreclosure
action by the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC").115 Plaintiffs, in an
attempt to stop the RTC from foreclosing on their property, claimed perfect equity and title to the property superior to the RTC's recorded note
and deed to secure debt based on an unrecorded real estate purchase
agreement."1 6 The court explained that "[tlhe D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
is a 'common law rule of estoppel precluding a borrower from asserting
against the [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")] defenses
based upon secret or unrecorded side agreements that alter[] the terms of
[a] facially unqualified obligation.' "117 The court held that the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine conclusively barred plaintiffs from asserting any defenses to the RTC's position as holder in due course of the note and their
foreclosure action thereunder. 18
A real estate agent approached plaintiffs, Barbara and Gordon Milligan
(the "Milligans"), and Gordon Milligan's mother in 1987 about selling
their adjoining residential properties in Savannah, Georgia to the broker's
client Gilmore Meyer Incorporated ("GMI"). For tax reasons, the Milligans entered into an agreement whereby they would sell their property
and Milligan's mother's property to GMI in return for cash and a residence that GMI agreed to purchase and build for the Milligans, with the
cash going to Milligan's mother. After selecting a lot in a subdivision in
Savannah, the Milligans and GMI closed on the purchase of their residence and surrounding property. At closing, the Milligans entered into a
separate real estate contract with GMI, which they never recorded, to acquire the new subdivision lot on which GMI agreed to construct their new
home. The contract stated that GMI had good and marketable title to the
new lot and that the Milligans had paid GMI for the new lot and a to-be114. 315 U.S. 447 (1942). Explaining the doctrine, the court in Milligan pointed to a
recent Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in which that court described the events
that gave rise to D'Oench. 775 F. Supp. at 404. In Vernon v. Resolution Trust Corp., 907
F.2d 1101 (11th Cir. 1990), the Eleventh Circuit, in describing the facts of D'Oench, stated
that a bank obtained a promissory note from another party while promising them not to
enforce the note and to refund any interest charged on the note to hide a defaulted loan on
its books. Id. at 1104. After the bank failed, the FDIC attempted to collect on the note while
the notemaker claimed he owed nothing to the bank. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted the
Supreme Court's conclusion "that there exists 'a federal policy to protect [the FDIC], and
the public funds which it administers, against migrepresentations as to the securities or
other assets in the portfolios of the banks which [the FDIC] insures or to which it makes
loans.'" Id. (quoting D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 457). The Court held the notemaker
liable on the note because to allow him to escape liability would violate public policy. Id.
115. 775 F. Supp. at 405.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 403-04 (quoting Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 901
F.2d 1244, 1248 (5th Cir. 1990)).
118. Id. at 404-05, 410.
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constructed home. In fact, GMI did not have legal title to the new lot, but
rather had an executory purchase contract for it. GMI never actually acquired legal title to the new lot. A related company, Preston Gilmore
Construction Company, Inc. ("PGCCI"), actually purchased the new lot
from its owner and obtained legal title to it. Immediately thereafter,
PGCCI obtained a construction loan to build the home on the new lot by
signing a promissory note and giving a deed to secure debt on the new lot
to NCF Mortgage Company ("NCF"), a subsidiary of North Carolina
Savings & Loan Association, F.A. ("NCSLA"). NCF recorded this deed in
the clerk of the superior court's office in the county in which the lot was
situated." 9
After taking possession of the new residence in 1989, the Milligans discovered that they did not have a recorded title to the property. The Milligans then brought suit for specific performance and damages against
PGCCI, GMI, and the individual owners of GMI in September 1989. RTC
was appointed Conservator for NCSLA in March 1990. In June of that
year, NCF assigned the deed to secure debt and accompanying note to
NCSLA who then recorded the assignment. Soon thereafter, PGCCI defaulted on the note and RTC, as Conservator for NCSLA, commenced
foreclosure proceedings on the deed to secure debt in August 1990. Following RTC's foreclosure action that same month, the Milligans amended
their complaint adding RTC, NCSLA and NCF as defendants in an attempt to prevent RTC from foreclosing on the deed to secure debt. The
lower court granted the Milligans a temporary restraining order. 2 '
RTC became Receiver for NCSLA in September of 1990 and removed
the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia pursuant to provisions in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA").' 2 1 RTC filed a motion
for summary judgment citing, inter alia, the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine of
federal common law.

22

After discussing the requirements for granting a summary judgment,
the court analyzed the preclusive effect of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
to plaintiffs' claims against RTC. 2 1 As mentioned previously, the court
noted that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine precludes defendants from asserting defenses against the FDIC based upon unrecorded collateral or
side agreements.' The court further explained that the doctrine was initially limited to the FDIC, but now it is settled law that the Federal Sav119.

Id. at 401-02.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 402.
Id.; Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1992)).
775 F. Supp. at 402.
Id. at 403-04.
Id.
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ings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") may assert the doctrine
as receiver for failed savings and loans and that the RTC, as FSLIC's
corporate successor, may do likewise.1 1 The court also noted that the
doctrine initially applied only to cases factually similar to D'Oench,
Duhme, however, the doctrine has since been "expanded in the federal
common law well beyond that narrow factual setting

. .

. 'and now ap-

plies to virtually all cases' where a federal depository institution is confronted with an agreement not documented in the institution's
records.'"12 The court noted that the federal courts protect federal insurers by according them a holder in due course status under federal
common law, even though they may not technically qualify as such under
state law.12 7 Also, the court pointed out that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine has been "partially codified" in 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e), "2 which,
since FIRREA's enactment, applies to RTC. 1"
Plaintiffs' premised their claims against RTC on assertions of "perfect
equity" in their new1 residence through the sales contract with GMI and
"estoppel by deed."
The court stated that both parties wasted their
efforts by espousing alternate sides of these assertions and related arguments." ' The court pointed out that, even assuming plaintiffs' assertions
to be true and their legal conclusions to be correct, under federal common
law and the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, plaintiffs' claims must fail. 12 As
noted previously, RTC obtained holder in due course status under federal
common law with regard to the note and its accompanying security
125. Id. at 404.
126. Id. (quoting Baumann v. Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th
Cir. 1991)).
127. Id.
128. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1992).
129. 775 F. Supp. at 405. The court noted that section 1823(e) states that:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the Corporation
[FDIC] in any asset acquired by it ... either as security for a loan or by purchase
or as -eceiver of any insured depository institution, shall be valid against the Corporation unless such agreement(1) shall be in writing,
(2) was executed by the depository institution and any person claiming
an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously
with the acquisition of the asset by the depository institution,
(3) was approved by the board of directors of the depository institution
or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of
said board or committee, and
(4) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, and [sic] official record of the depository institution.

12 U.S.C. § 1823(e); 775 F. Supp. at 405.
130. 775 F. Supp. at 404.
131. Id. at 406.
132. Id.
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deed.' 3 The court examined the status of a holder in due course under
Georgia law and concluded that plaintiffs could not defeat the RTC's status.'3 4 The court noted that, under Georgia law, one may defeat a holder
in due course's claim to an instrument only by showing the existence of at
least one of five defenses to the holder's claim provided by statute.135 Although two of the five defenses were potentially applicable to plaintiffs'
claims, the court determined that by their definitions and given the allegations, these defenses were not available to plaintiffs.' 6 The court analyzed a fraud in factum defense and a null or void instrument defense to
RTC's holder in due course status and found that, based on the evidence,
the note was, at best, a voidable'note rather than a void one. 137 Furthermore, there potentially existed only fraud in the inducement, not fraud in
the factum, in plaintiffs' execution of the note.' 38 Therefore, the court
held, plaintiffs could not assert any defenses to the
RTC's status as
13 9
holder in due course of the note under Georgia law.
Finding all of plaintiffs' potential defenses to RTC's holder in due
course status under the note to have failed at law, the court granted summary judgment in favor of RTC. ' 0 The court noted that the "result [was]
harsh. Nevertheless, [als pitiful as the [pilaintiff's situation may be, a
more compelling consideration, in view of the monstrous national debt
burden imposed by the spate of recent bank failures, is the sanctity and
uniform application of the D'Oench doctrine and [12 U.S.c. §
1823(e)]." ' l
133. See supra note 118.
134. 775 F. Supp. at 406.
135. Id. The court stated that
[uinder Georgia law, a holder in-due course takes an instrument free from:
(1) All claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) All defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not
dealt except:
(a) Infancy ..
(b) Such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction as renders
the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) Such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with
neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character
or essential terms; and
(d) Discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) Any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the
instrument.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 11-3-305 (1982)).
136. Id. at 406-07.
137. Id. at 408.
138. Id. at 407.
139. Id. at 409.
140. Id. at 410.
141. Id.
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PARTNERSHIPS

During the survey period the district courts, the court of appeals, and
the supreme court decided several cases dealing with partnership law. Although no new and startling developments occurred during the survey period, several cases are worth noting in this Article.
In Antonic Rigging & Erecting of Missouri, Inc. v. Foundry East Ltd.
1 42
Partnership,
the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Georgia reviewed certain aspects of limited partnership law to determine contribution issues relating to subscription agreements, when a limited partner becomes liable as a general partner, and basic contract law. " 3
A Georgia limited partnership was formed with NAPPCO, Inc.
("NAPPCO") as general partner, and Mayflower Group, Ltd.
("Mayflower Group"), Mayflower Foundry ("Mayflower Foundry"), and
NAPPCO as the limited partners. The partnership obtained industrial
revenue bonds from Warren County to develop a steel fitting and pipe
foundry in Warrington, Georgia. The partnership agreement set forth the
capital contributions of the partners as follows: NAPPCO-twenty thousand dollars for its general partner interest and nine hundred eighty
thousand dollars for its limited partner interest, Mayflower Foundry-eight hundred thousand dollars, and Mayflower Group-twenty
thousand dollars. Additionally, the partners signed a subscription agreement that set forth certain additional capital contributions up to an additional three million dollars. Antonic began contract negotiations with the
representatives of the general partner before the formation of the partnership. The partnership encountered financial difficulties and Antonic
sued for breach of contract under three separate agreements. The majority of the contract negotiations occurred between representatives of
Antonic and representatives of NAPPCO. NAPPCO began experiencing
financial difficulties and eventually resigned as general partner. A new
general partner, AMT Foundry, Inc. ("AMT"), became the substitute
general partner and specifically did not assume the obligations of the
prior general partner. The Mayflower entities eventually owned one hundred percent of the issued and outstanding shares of AMT. The partnership owed Antonic a substantial amount of money and Antonic also
sought a termination fee, late charges, cancellation charges and penalties
for bad faith litigation, and attorney fees. Both sides moved for summary
judgment.'
Antonic tried to establish Mayflower's liability, by alleging that
Mayflower agreed pursuant to the subscription agreement to supply addi142. 773 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Ga. 1991).
143. Id. at 422.
144. Id. at 423-26.

19921

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

87

tional capital, and that Mayflower had failed to make its initial capital
contribution, in violation of the Georgia Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("GRULPA").'" The court determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning the initial capital contribution that
allowed Antonic to survive the partnership's summary judgment motion."16 With respect to the additional capital contributioh issue, the trial
court needed to address whether the subscription agreement created a
binding obligation on the part of Mayflower to make additional capital
contributions or obtain other funding for the partnership."17 Although the
subscription agreement contained a section whereby Mayflower agreed to
contribute or arrange for additional capital, the subscription agreement
also stated that if Mayflower failed to satisfy its obligations, NAPPCO
could arrange for such contribution or loan, the Mayflower entities' percentage of distributions would be reduced, and the Mayflower entities
would not be liable for any damages other than such reduction for failing
to meet any obligations set forth in the subscription agreement."48 The
court determined that the clear language of the subscription agreement
stated "that the sole remedy for failure. . . to contribute or obtain a loan
[was) the restructuring of limited partnership units or distribution
rights.""11 9 The court refused to find the subscription agreement created
an enforceable agreement by the Mayflower entities to contribute the additional capital to the partnership. 5 '
Antonic argued that assuming the limited partners were not liable to
each other, the subscription agreement did not bar Antonic as a creditor
from pursuing the limited partners."8 ' The court determined that
GRULPA allows limited partnerships to be structured to prevent creditors from recovering based on a limited partner's failure to meet its contribution obligation.'12 The court quoted O.C.G.A. section 14-9-502(c),'18
which states that "[u]nless otherwise provided in the partnership agreement, the obligation of a partner to make a contribution to the capital of
the partnership may be reduced or eliminated only by consent of all of
[the] parties.'' 64 The court examined the legislative history of this section
and determined that the legislature intended it to apply to creditors who
145.
146.
147.

O.C.G.A. § 14-9-502 (1989).
773 F. Supp. at 427.
Id. at 427-28.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 428.
Id.
Id.
Id,
Id. at 428-29 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-9-502 (1989)),
O.C.G.A. § 14-9-502(c) (1989).
773 F. Supp. at 428-29 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-9-502(c)).
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relied on limited partners' contribution obligations.'" The court compared this section to Georgia law before its enactment, which specifically
made a limited partner liable to the partnership for any unpaid contribution.'" The former code section, 14-9A-48(c), stated that a waiver by the
general partners did not affect the rights of the creditor of the partnership, which extended credit after the filing of the partnership's
certificate
15 7
and before a cancellation or amendment of the certificate.
The court discussed the differences between GRULPA and the Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act'58 ("RULPA"), which has been
adopted in many jurisdictions.I " The court determined that the Georgia
legislators specifically intended to limit a creditor's recovery based on
contribution obligations and that the subscription agreement contained
the consent of the parties to reduce or eliminate such contributions as
allowed in GRULPA."O
Next, Antonic argued that certain actions by the Mayflower entities
would allow such entities to be held responsible as general partners for
the obligations of the partnership. 161 Antonic alleged that Mayflower participated in the management and control of the partnership."' 2 The court
rejected Antonic's argument because O.C.G.A. section 14-9-503, e1 specifically states that "[a] limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a
limited partnership by reason of being a limited partner and does not
become so by participating in the management or control of the business."164 The court discussed the change in GRULPA from prior Georgia
law and RULPA.165 The court discussed the Georgia legislators' explicit
rejection of the control rule and that this rejection addressed criticisms of
many commentators concerning the uncertainty of the application of the
control rule."'
The court found, however, that even under GRULPA a limited partner
could be found liable as a general partner through estoppel, fraud, or gen155. Id.
156. Id. (comparing GRULPA to its predecessor O.C.G.A. § 14-9A-48(c) (1952)).
157. Id. at 429 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-9A-48 (1952)).
158. 6 U.L.A. 500 (West Supp. 1991) (providing that a creditor extending credit or relying on a contribution obligation can enforce that obligation).
159. 773 F. Supp. at 429-30.
160. Id. at 430.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. O.C.G.A. § 14-9-503 (1989).
164. 773 F. Supp. at 430 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-9-503),
165. Id. (The court specifically compared OC.G.A. § 14-9A-41 (1989) and 6 U.L.A. 303
(West Supp. 1991) (RULPA)).
166. Id. at 431 (citing Joseph J. Basile, Limited Liability for Limited Partners;An Argument for the Abolition of the Control Rule, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1199 (1985)).
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eral equitable grounds under a "veil piercing" theory if the limited partner's participation and control misled third parties into believing that the
limited partner acted as a general partner.' e The court analyzed each of
these three exceptions. 6 The court determined that a general partnership by estoppel may exist if a creditor relied on the actions of a limited
partner holding itself out as a general partner or on that limited partner's
consent to representations made by another person'that the limited partner is a general partner.' Also, the court stated that creditor reliance is
not necessary if the limited partner makes or consents to any type of
public representation that the limited partner is a general partner.M The
to find general partnership by estoppel based on the facts in
court refused
7
this case.1 1
The Mayflower entities wholly owned and controlled AMT, the substitute general partner, and the court conceded that this ownership might
give rise to an inference that could be seen as abusing the corporate entity.1 72 However, the court founid no evidence that the Mayflower entities
planned to perpetuate fraud in this situation. 173 The court did not find
that the Mayflower entities formed AMT to avoid legal liability to
to pierce the corporate veil to find the Mayflower
Antonic and refused
17 4
entities liable.
This case set forth several partnership theories of liability andseemed
to indicate that the court would protect a limited partner's limited liability to creditors of a limited partnership. This decision illustrates that
GRULPA's abbrogation of the control rule may not be a bullet proof protection for limited partners. However, the decision reiterated GRULPA's
basis in the rights of partners to contract the various aspects of their
partnerships. Plaintiffs failed to make an argument concerning the unity
of the general and limited partner interests as a veil piercing rationale
which may have been a persuasive argument.
In Stedry v. Mitchell,'" the court of appeals determined that the trial
court could have found from the evidence presented that the promises of
a management company and a secretary of one of the defendants, as

167. Id.
168. Id. at 431-33.
169. Id. at 431. Cf. Pope v. Triangle Chem. Co., 157 Ga. App. 386, 277 S.E.2d 758 (1981).
In drawing this conclusion, the court relied on O.C.G.A. § 14-8-16(a), which deals with partnership estoppel, and applied it to the context of a limited partner. O.C.G.A. § 14-8-16(a)
(1989); 773 F. Supp. at 431.
170. 773 F. Supp. at 431.
171. Id. at 432.
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38, 39, 401 S.E.2d 738, 739-40 (1991)).
174. Id. at 432-33.'
175. 201 Ga. App. 682, 411 S.E.2d 735 (1991).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

agents for the partnership, illustrated the personal liability of the defendants as general partners. 176 This case concerned a general partnership
formed with the purpose of owning and operating certain apartments.
The statement of partnership allowed Southern Diversified Properties,
Inc. ("Southern") to manage and control the business and assets of the
partnership and exclusively operate the apartment complex owned by the
partnership. Defendants failed to provide evidence at trial that the partnership owned the property and title remained in defendants' names.
Southern employed its subsidiary, Apartment Management Company
("AMC"), to manage the apartment complex. Subsequently, Southern
terminated AMC, one of the defendants, as the manager of the partnership's property. However, AMC's personal secretary became actively involved with the property.177 This involvement allowed the court to find
that AMC and the secretary acted as agents of the partnership and defendants as general partners were liable for such actions. 178
In Wilensky v. Blalock,17 the supreme court found that a partnership
existed between certain parties, and thus, as partners, they owed each
other a duty to act in utmost good faith toward each other.610 This case
concerned certain parties who were partners in various enterprises and
made money from originating mortgages. One of the partners, Arford,
took actions to dissolve the partnership and a third party, Wilensky, encouraged Arford to terminate the partnership and retain the assets of the
partnership. Wilensky further encouraged Arford to retain the partnership's business relationship with the mortgage servicer, Gulf States Mortgage Company, Inc. ("Gulf States"). The jury found the existence of a
partnership and rejected Arford's defense of lack of a partnership. Arford
then argued that he had no liability for the termination of the partnership because such a partnership relationship could be terminated at will.
The court of appeals decided that Arford focused too narrowly on the
inquiry into contractual obligation and stated that the obligations of
partners reaches beyond the moment of termination in certain situations. 81 The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals that the
partnership agreement, as a matter of law, required partners to act in
utmost good faith toward each other.182 The supreme court determined
that the court of appeals' analysis of a California case, which stated that a
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
S.E.2d

Id. at 684, 411 S.E.2d at 737.
Id. at 682-83, 411 S.E.2d at 736-37.
Id. at 683, 411 S.E.2d at 737.
262 Ga. 95, 414 S.E.2d 1 (1992).
Id. at 98, 414 S.E.2d at 4.
Id. at 95-97, 414 S.E.2d at 2-3.
Id. at 98, 414 S.E.2d at 4 (citing Arford v. Blalock, 199 Ga. App. 434, 437, 405
698, 702 (1991)).
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"partner's exercise of the right to terminate the partnership, if done in
bad faith for the purpose of appropriating to that partner's benefit the
prosperity of the partnership, would be a violation the partnership agree8
ment and would constitute wrongful dissolution of the partnership.' 3
The supreme court found the holding in the California case consistent
with Georgia law.'18 The supreme court stated that a partner's right to
dissolve a partnership, if done in bad faith and in violation of the partner's fiduciary duty to the other partners by attempting to appropriate
partnership assets without adequate compensation to the other partners,
would constitute a wrongful dissolution.'8 5 Also, the court determined
that the partner wrongfully dissolving the partnership would be liable
under the Uniform Partnership Act,'"8 setting forth the rights of parties
upon wrongful dissolution as a violation of the implied agreement not to
exclude wrongfully the other partner from a partnership business opportunity.181 Although the contract in this case provided for a right to terminate at will, it did not allow a partner during the course of termination to
retain the assets and business opportunities of the partnership for himself.' 88 The supreme court noted'that Arford excluded Blalock from the
place of business of the partnership and retained the material assets and
continuing income from the mortgage origination business, which constituted a breach of such implied duties contained in the oral partnership
agreement and this breach caused damages to Blalock.'" 9
This case illustrates the supreme court's inclination to find an oral
partnership in situations of a continuing business relationship and to imply a duty of good faith in dealings between the partners of such a partnership. Most partnership agreements may be terminated upon the agreement of the parties and such a termination requires some sort of
accounting between the partners, rather than allowing one partner to retain the assets and opportunities of the partnership. These protections
should be important in business relationships for which a written partnership agreement does not specifically provide.
In Borgh v. Gentry,'" the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals examined
accounting and breach of contract issues in a general partnership situation.1 91 Borgh and Gentry formed a general partnership in 1985 to engage

183. Id. (citing Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961)).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-8-1 to -44 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
187. 262 Ga. at 98, 414 S.E.2d at 4.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 99, 414 S.E.2d at 4.
190. 953 F.2d 1309 (11th Cir. 1992).
191. Id. at 1311.
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in a dog racing operation. The partnership agreement required Borgh to
pay Gentry one hundred fifty thousand dollars, consisting of forty five
thousand dollars for the purchase of greyhounds and one hundred five
thousand dollars for the operation and management of the dog racing
venture. Gentry acted as the managing partner and all profits and losses
went into the partnership with each partner agreeing to contribute additional sums of money if necessary for the operation of the partnership.
The partnership agreement provided that each partner would receive
thirty-five percent of the purse winnings from race track bookings and
provided for the division of the balance after the payment of all partnership expenses. After the partnership became unprofitable, Borgh began
removing dogs from the operations and used them for his personal bookings. Also, Borgh filed an action for accounting and dissolution of the
partnership. Gentry agreed to such dissolution and counterclaimed for a
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. Borgh argued that the
lower court improperly denied him the right to trial by jury based on the
breach of contract claim.1 29 The court reversed the lower court and determined that although accounting is an equitable claim, breach of contract
is a legal issue for the jury.1 The court of appeals agreed with the lower
court's finding that Borgh's removal of the dogs interfered with the partnership's operations, thereby requiring Gentry to spend approximately
fifty thousand dollars to replace the missing dogs.' 94 Although the court
affirmed the district court's findings relating to the accounting issues,. the
case was remanded for a jury trial on the contract issue. 1
In another case decided during the survey period, Henderson v. Cherry,
Bekaert & Hollin,'O' the court discussed the proper service of process on
a partnership. 197 The court found that although the service was made
upon a manager of the partnership and not a partner, service made on an
agent in a position to afford reasonable assurance that the agent will provide notice to principals of the partnership that process has been served
acts as adequate service of process on the partnership.198.
In Williams v. Tritt,191 the supreme court determined that the Georgia
Uniform Partnership Act"'0 provides a right for a general partner to a
formal accounting of partnership affairs upon the wrongful exclusion of
192. Id. at 1310-11.
193. Id. at 1311 (citing Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1563 (Fed.
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1308 (1991)).
194. Id. at 1312.
195. Id.
196. 932 F.2d 1410 (lth Cir. 1991).
197. Id. at 1410-11.
198. Id. at 1412.
199. 262 Ga. 173, 415 S.E.2d 285 (1992).
200. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-8-1 to -44 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
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the partner from the partnership business.201 The court found that a
partner's direct derivation of benefits from the conduction of the partnership's business without the other partner's consent allowed a right to
accounting.102
Although the cases decided in the partnership area during the survey
period did not provide any new and startling guidance for practitioners,
the cases illustrated the court's concern with the fair and just relationship
between partners of a general partnership and the protections afforded to
limited partners in a statutorily created limited partnership context.
IV. SECURITIES

The state and federal courts examined issues relating to the application
of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act"),"'3 as amended, and its Georgia equivalent,204 the definition of a
security, 0 5 reasonable reliance, 0 and the validity of an arbitration
20 7
contract.
In Abrams & Wofsy v. Renaissance Investment Corp.,208 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia examined the
adequacy of the disclosure in private placement memoranda used to sell
limited partnership units in three limited partnerships for which Renaissance served as the general partner.0 9 Renaissance had extreme financial
problems that ultimately led to foreclosure by the lenders upon each
partnership's property and the loss of the limited partners' investment.
Alleging violations of Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act 2 10 for material
omissions in the disclosure materials, the limited partners sued, individually, two officers of Renaissance. "1
201. 262 Ga. at 174, 415 S.E.2d at 286 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-8-21 (1989) (accounting right
under partnership agreement); O.C.G.A. § 14-8-22 (1989) (accounting right when circumstances render it just and reasonable)).

202. Id.
203.
Sec. L.
204.
205.
(1991).
206.
(1992).
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1981); Abrams & Wofsy v. Renaissance Inv. Corp., 1992 Fed.
Rep. (CCH) 96,459 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 1991).
O.C.G.A. § 10-5-12(a)(2) (1989 & Supp. 1992).
Cohen v. William Goldberg & Co., 202 Ga. App. 172, 179, 413 S.E.2d 759, 766
Hamilton v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 203 Ga. App. 679, 680, 417 S.E.2d 713, 714
Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 854 (llth Cir. 1992).
1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,459 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 1991).
Id.
92,028.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 92,029.
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The court discussed the standard of review and found that each of the
officers violated Rule lOb-521 2 Chisholm, vice president of administration
for Renaissance, openly admitted her failure to disclose, relevant information obviously important to investors.2 The court found that Chisholm
knowingly omitted a material
fact on which plaintiffs relied that proxi2 4
mately caused their losses.
The court stated that the materiality of the omission of the financial
difficulties of the general partner satisfied plaintiffs' reliance requirement.210 The relationship of plaintiffs' economic harm satisfied the loss
causation requirement of a 10b-5 action because the general partner's financial condition acted as at least a "significant contributing cause" of
their losses. 2 16 The court stated that transaction causation is synonymous
with reliance, and therefore, plaintiffs could recover against Chisholm. 17
The court's analysis of the actions of Charles M. Shirley, vice president
of finance who helped prepare the misleading financial statements, mirrored the discussion above, except the court found that Shirley acted with
severe recklessness rather than with knowledge.2 1 The court noted that
the Eleventh Circuit has determined that severe recklessness satisfies the
scienter requirement for Rule 10b-5 purposes.2 9 The court noted that its
finding of the elements of Rule 10b-5 also satisfied plaintiffs' claims
under the Georgia securities laws.220
In Loyola Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Fickling,22 1 the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia briefly addressed
a Rule 10b-5 issue concerning the duty of a defendant with respect to
allegations of omissions and affirmative misrepresentations. 22 2 Also, the
court noted that a direct duty to a party is not required to assert aider
and abettor liability under Rule 10b-5.22 s In a case concerning the guarantee of a loan, the evidence showed that representatives of defendant altered certain documents involved in a loan transaction after Fickling's
212. Id. 92,030, 92,034.
213. Id. 92,030.
214. Id. (citing Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 728 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1924 (1990)).
215. Id. 92,031.
216. Id. (quoting Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1989)).
217. Id.
218. Id. 92,032.
219. Id. (citing McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir.
1989)).
220. Id. 92,033.
221. 783 F. Supp. 620 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
222. Id. at 626 (citing Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1043 (11th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987)).
223. Id. (citing Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1009 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied,
772 F.2d 918 (1985)).

1992]

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

95

execution of such documents.'" Fickling alleged that these representatives-committed securities fraud and the
court refused to grant summary
2 6
judgment to defendants on this issue. 2
In Cohen v. William Goldberg & Co., 22 1 the court of appeals addressed
the definition of a security under Georgia and federal securities laws.22
The sole stockholder of T-Shirtery, Inc. agreed to exchange his stock for
stock in an acquiring corporation and to become an officer and director of
the acquiror. Cohen alleged that the stock in the new corporation (the
"WGC stock") met the definition of a security and afforded him protections under the state and federal securities laws.2 28 The court applied the
test in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth22 and found that the WGC
stock did not "'bear[] such characteristics usually associated with common stock that a purchaser justifiably may assume that appropriate securit[ies] laws apply.' "230 The WGC stock certificates were to be legended
to reference substantial restrictions on transferability and that the stock
was not registered under the Georgia or federal securities laws, and thus
could not be resold without such registration.2 ' Due to these impairments on negotiability, the court determined that32 the WGC stock did not
2
fit within the statutory definition of a security.
The court next applied the economic reality test from Securities Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co.2 8 to decide if the WGC Stock
involved an investment in a common venture with the investor reasonably
expecting profits derived from the efforts of others.2 ' The court decided
that Cohen's status as an officer and director allowed him to control many
decisions affecting the corporation's profits, and therefore, did not prove
reliance on the efforts of others. 88 The court refused to find that the
286
WGC stock fit into the definition of a security.
In applying the Landreth test, the court failed to appreciate that stock
is not required to meet all the Landreth characteristics to fit within the
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id.
202 Ga. App. 172, 413 S.E.2d 759 (1991).
Id. at 179, 413 S.E.2d at 766.
Id. at 172, 413 S.E.2d at 761.

229. 471 U.S. 681, 685-686 (1985).
230. 202 Ga. App. at 179, 413 S.E.2d at 766 (quoting Henderson v. KM Systems, Inc.,
188 Ga. App. 893, 897, 374 S.E.2d 550, 553 (1988)).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
234. 202 Ga. App. at 179-80, 413 S.E.2d at 766 (citing Tech Resources v. Hubbard, 246
Ga. 583, 584, 272 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1980)).
235. Id. at 180, 413 S.E.2d at 766-67.
236. Id. at 179, 413 S.E.2d at 766.
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definition of a "security." As noted in a previous article analyzing a similar case,"' although nonregistration of stock impairs its transferability,
such stock can be transferred in a transaction exempt from the application of federal and state securities laws. Additionally, the anti-fraud provision of both the federal and state securities laws apply to unregistered
stock and purchasers of unregistered stock are arguably more deserving of
the protections of such laws than purchasers of registered stock with access to disclosure materials. The Howey investment contract analysis applied by the court in Cohen fails to recognize that Cohen's status as an
officer and director became effective after his stock was exchanged for
WGC stock and he had no control over WGC at the time he received the
WGC stock. Cohen deserved disclosure to make the investment decision
required in the exchange. Georgia practitioners may find it beneficial to
bring securities laws claims in federal court rather than Georgia courts,
which continue to dilute shareholder protections by their interpretations
of federal standards.
In Hamilton v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells,38 the court of appeals determined that a stock purchaser may not reasonably rely after receiving constructive notice of misrepresentations or omissions to a corporation's public filings with the SEC. 2s 9 Hamilton studied certain filings by Ocilla
Industries, Inc. ("Ocilla") made on Form 10-Q and Form 10-K in his decision to purchase Ocilla stock. Hamilton sustained losses when stock prices
fell after disclosure of certain improprieties of management and certain
financial irregularities.24 0 The court found that Ocilla filed a current report of Form 8-K before Hamilton purchased his stock disclosing these
problems and specifically stated that the financial statements would require substantial revision and should not be relied upon.2" The court
found that the Form 8-K filing and accompanying press release, which
acted as constructive notice to Hamilton and other investors, constituted
the best method to inform the public of the issues.242 In view of this constructive notice, the court refused to view Hamilton's reliance as reasonable or justified2 42
In Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co.,2 4 4 the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals determined that in spite of the Federal Arbitration Act,2"4 the
237. Paul A. Quir6s & Michael L. Chapman, Business Associations, 41 MERCER L. REV.
45 (1989) (citing Henderson v. KM Systems, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 893, 374 S.E.2d 550 (1988)).
238. 203 Ga. App. 679, 417 S.E.2d 713 (1992).
239. Id. at 680, 417 S.E.2d at 714-15.
240. Id. at 679, 417 S.E.2d at 713-14.
241. Id. at 680-81, 417 S.E.2d at 714.
242. Id. at 681, 417 S.E.2d at 714-15.
243. Id., 417 S.E.2d at 715.
244. 957 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1992).
245. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1970).
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district courts are charged with the determination of the validity of a contract compelling arbitration with respect to a brokerage account. 24" This
case concerned certain account agreements containing arbitration clauses,
which were admittedly not executed by Chastain.2 41 The court stated that

the district court would not be addressing the merits of arbitrating the
claims, but would be addressing the enforceability and validity of the
contract compelling arbitration.2 48
The court distinguished the Supreme Court's ruling in Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 24 9 which addressed a fraudulent inducement to sign a contract containing arbitration clauses, rather
than the validity of such a contract. ' 5° The court did not address Robinson-Humphrey's defenses of authority to bind and ratification of the contracts, stating they could be raised before the district court.25'
As these cases illustrate, the Georgia courts are being asked to extend
the protections of the Georgia and federal securities laws to varied stockrelated transactions.

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

957 F.2d'at 852-53.
Id. at 853.
Id.
388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
957 F.2d at 854.
Id. at 855-56.

